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ABSTRACT
Objective: To investigate the effect of targeted
marginal annual investments by local healthcare
commissioners on the outcomes they expected to
achieve with these investments.
Design: Controlled before and after study.
Setting: 152 commissioning organisations (primary
care trusts) in England.
Methods: National surveys of commissioning
managers in 2009 and 2010 to identify: the largest
marginal investments made in four key conditions/
services (diabetes, coronary heart disease, chronic
pulmonary airways disease and emergency and urgent
care) in 2008/2009 and 2009/2010; the outcomes
commissioners expected to achieve with these
investments; and the processes commissioners used
to develop these investments. Collation of routinely
available data on outcomes commissioners expected
from these investments over the period 2007/2008 to
2010/2011.
Results: 51% (77/152) of commissioners agreed to
participate in the survey in 2009 and 60% (91/152) in
2010. Around half reported targeted marginal
investments in each condition/service each year.
Routine data on many of the outcomes they expected
to achieve through these investments were not
available. Also, commissioners expected some
outcomes to be achieved beyond the time scale of our
study. Therefore, only a limited number of outcomes of
investments were tested. Outcomes included directly
standardised emergency admission rates for the four
conditions/services, and the percentage of patients with
diabetes with glycated haemoglobin <7. There was no
evidence that targeted marginal investments reduced
emergency admission rates. There was evidence of an
improvement in blood glucose management for
diabetes for commissioners investing to improve
diabetes care but this was compromised by a change
in how the outcome was measured in different years.
This investment was unlikely to be cost-effective.
Conclusions: Commissioners made marginal
investments in specific health conditions and services
with the aim of improving a wide range of outcomes.
There was little evidence of impact on the limited
number of outcomes measured.
BACKGROUND
In some countries the responsibility for
ensuring that healthcare is available to the
population lies with commissioning organisa-
tions.1 Approaches to commissioning vary in
terms of type of organisation, funding
sources and terminology, both between coun-
tries and over time within the same country.
Despite this, evidence relating to commis-
sioning models in one country at a particular
time may be informative for other contexts.
The term ‘commissioning’ is used in the
National Health Service (NHS) in England to
describe a wide range of activities such as
assessing needs, allocating resources to best
meet those needs, establishing contractual
arrangements with service providers, and
monitoring outcomes.2 It is distinguished
Strengths and limitations of this study
▪ Between 2006 and 2013, primary care trusts
were expected to improve access to services, the
quality of services, health outcomes and effi-
ciency, and reduce health inequalities. Annual
marginal investments in specific services or
health conditions was one approach taken by
local healthcare commissioners to improve
outcomes.
▪ The strength of the study was that it aimed to
address an evidence gap by investigating the
effect of these targeted marginal annual invest-
ments on the outcomes commissioners expected
to achieve with these investments.
▪ Surveys of healthcare commissioners identified
investments made; routine data was used to test
the impact on expected outcomes using a con-
trolled before and after design.
▪ Limitations were the limited amount of routine
data available nationally, the lack of consistent
measurement of some indicators over time, and
the difficulty attributing change to the invest-
ments made.
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from the purchasing of healthcare by its proactive and
strategic intent.3 Commissioning healthcare in England
occurs at different levels, from an individual perspective
of using personal budgets through to a regional or
national perspective of commissioning specialised
hospital services.4 A large amount of commissioning
occurs at a local level by groups acting on behalf of local
populations (we will call this local commissioning within
this paper). Between 2006 and 2013 local commissioning
was undertaken by 152 primary care trusts (PCTs) in
conjunction with practice-based commissioners from
primary care. In April 2013 PCTs were replaced by
Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) and a national
NHS commissioning board (more recently called NHS
England). PCTs were responsible for commissioning
healthcare to average populations of around 330 000 and
were expected to achieve outcomes including improve-
ments in the quality of services, more efﬁcient use of
resources (eg, reduction in emergency admission rates),
improvements in access to services (eg, reductions in
waiting times for outpatients), improvements in health,
reductions in health inequalities, and ﬁnancial balance.
Evidence of the effectiveness of local commissioning
There is little research evidence of the effectiveness of
local commissioning. The tendency has been to study
processes and organisational issues due to the speed of
change around introducing new local commissioning
models.5 An overview of the impact of commissioning
reforms in England identiﬁed different ways of measur-
ing the outcomes of commissioning reforms.3 The con-
clusion of the review was that there is relatively little
robust research evidence about the performance of
local commissioning. The authors described evidence of
a limited effect on shifting services out of hospital but
cite achievement of reductions in waiting times for treat-
ment, procuring new services and securing ﬁnancial
balance after a deﬁcit. They found few studies which
quantiﬁed impact but cite evidence of variation in
service use around the country as an indication of con-
tinuing inefﬁciency. A comprehensive literature review
of the impact of clinical commissioning models also con-
cluded that research evidence is limited.6 This review
identiﬁed some evidence of reductions in referrals from
primary to secondary care, occupied bed days for emer-
gency admissions, prescribing costs and waits for elective
surgery and outpatients. Other studies have found that
local commissioners who prioritised speciﬁc outcomes,
such as numbers of people stopping smoking and breast
screening coverage, achieved more improvement in
these outcomes than those not prioritising them.7
A cross-sectional study showed that as expenditure by
local commissioners increased, mortality decreased for
circulatory diseases and cancer.8 However, this was a
cross-sectional study and it is important to measure the
effect of change over time in actions taken by local com-
missioners in order to better understand causal
relationships.
Addressing the evidence gap
Since there is limited evidence of the effectiveness of
local healthcare commissioning, we aimed to contribute
to the evidence base by focusing on the effect of mar-
ginal investments by local commissioners. Research has
shown that commissioners are more likely to make mar-
ginal investments or disinvestments related to priority
setting and rationing than engage in large strategic
change.9 Healthcare commissioners make marginal
investments each year which they hope will deliver spe-
ciﬁc outcomes in a speciﬁc time frame. Our aim was to
test whether local commissioners achieved what they
hoped in the time frame expected. Our focus was not to
describe or make judgements about the mechanisms by
which commissioners hoped to achieve their goals, but
to measure whether commissioners achieved these goals.
We were also interested in the commissioning processes
they used to develop these investments because of the
national focus on the quality of commissioning at the
time of our research, for example, the inclusion of clini-
cians in commissioning decisions. Therefore, a second-
ary aim was to measure the effect of different
commissioning processes on any outcomes achieved.
Before embarking on the study we were aware of a
number of difﬁculties associated with using nationally
available routine data to measure the effect of marginal
investments by local commissioners. The ﬁrst was that
the analysis was dependent on the availability of routine
data relevant to changes commissioners wished to effect,
in particular that it needed to be measured consistently
over a period of a number of years. It is also the case
that the changes that commissioners attempt to achieve
can be affected by many other groups such as acute and
primary care providers, making attribution to local com-
missioners’ investments difﬁcult. We undertook the
study despite these difﬁculties because it is important to
understand the extent to which commissioners are
achieving their goals. To address these difﬁculties we
used a controlled before and after design (comparing
changes in commissioners making investments com-
pared with those not making investments) over a short
time period (to minimise the chances of changes being
made to measurements collected routinely), with a large
number of local commissioners (to minimise the effect
of changes made by other organisations). We discuss
these issues further in the strengths and limitations
section of the paper, and suggest an alternative
approach in the implications section of the paper.
METHODS
Focus on marginal investments
As stated earlier, there are many aspects to commission-
ing.2 Our study focused on one aspect: healthcare com-
missioners making targeted marginal investments each
year with the expectation that these will affect outcomes
such as improving the health of a patient group or redu-
cing unnecessary attendance at secondary care within an
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expected time frame. Such investments are distinct from
unplanned changes to budgets, or budgetary increases
for undeﬁned purposes (eg, to take account of inﬂa-
tion). These marginal changes—which we call commis-
sioning initiatives—may require ﬁnancial investment,
reconﬁguration of services, or disinvestment to achieve
desired outcomes. During the time period of our study,
although some PCTs were in deﬁcit, the context was one
of increasing resource allocation to PCTs so PCTs
were making marginal investments rather than
disinvestments.
Commissioning is a complex process which attempts
to produce multiple outcomes. We focused on speciﬁc
conditions and services to allow us to explore the rela-
tionship between speciﬁc investments and speciﬁc out-
comes. We selected three long-term conditions—
diabetes, coronary heart disease (CHD) and chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)—and emergency
and urgent care services because they collectively repre-
sent a major burden of potentially preventable chronic
and acute ill-health at population level, and are major
areas of both primary and secondary care spending.8
Surveys to identify investments, expected outcomes
and commissioning processes
We needed to identify from local commissioners the
marginal investments they made in a particular ﬁnancial
year, the outcomes they hoped to achieve through these
investments, the time frame in which they hoped to
achieve these outcomes and the processes they used to
commission initiatives using these investments. To do
this, we undertook surveys of commissioning managers
in PCTs, the details of which have been published else-
where.10 Brieﬂy, we undertook telephone surveys of
commissioning managers in all 152 PCTs in 2009 and in
2010. Each year we undertook up to four structured tele-
phone interviews in each participating PCT, selecting a
commissioner leading each of our four conditions/
service. We used a structured questionnaire to identify
the largest initiative that had been commissioned by the
PCT (ie, investment of new money or reconﬁguration or
disinvestment of services) and that had started in the
previous ﬁnancial year. In the 2009 survey we also asked
if a larger initiative had occurred in the previous 2-year
period because this could affect outcomes in the time-
frame we were studying. Commissioners were then asked
to describe: whether the initiative was a reconﬁguration,
investment or a disinvestment; the scope of the initiative
(eg, whether it was aimed at all patients with diabetes in
the PCT or a speciﬁc group of patients with diabetes);
details of funding including the total amount of ﬁnan-
cial resource allocated; expected outcomes and when
they were expected; and processes used to develop and
manage the initiative. The processes included the extent
to which key stakeholders such as clinicians or patients
were involved in developing the initiative, the use of
needs assessment and an evidence-based approach, the
quality of management and leadership for the initiative
and the extent of barriers to making changes associated
with the initiative.10 We submitted the study to South
Humber Research Ethics Committee reference 08/
H1305/88 which classed it as a service evaluation.
Routine data for measuring expected outcomes
Having identiﬁed the outcomes which commissioners
wished to achieve with their marginal investments, we
then looked for data to measure these outcomes for all
PCTs over the time period 2007/2008 to 2010/2011.
Outside the context of a prospective evaluation, measur-
ing the outcomes achieved by local commissioners
requires the availability of routine data. Most routine
data at PCT level relate to the measurement of activity
and few relate directly to health outcomes. Key sources
of routine data relevant to the outcomes commissioners
hoped to achieve with their investments were the
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) for measuring hospital
utilisation rates and the Quality Outcomes Framework
(QOF) for measuring quality in primary care. There was
no routine data collected over the full-time period and
of good enough quality to measure some outcomes
expected by local commissioners: access to care, move-
ment of service provision into the community or emer-
gency department use. For example the quality of HES
outpatient data and HES emergency department data
was poor in the time period we addressed.
We located data on seven outcomes expected by com-
missioners: HES data on emergency admission rates for
each of the four conditions/service, and QOF data on
three disease-speciﬁc health outcomes in diabetes. The
disease-speciﬁc outcomes were the proportion of
patients with diabetes in a PCT with HbA1c<7, the pro-
portion of patients with diabetes in a PCT with
HbA1c<9, and the percentage of patients with diabetes
undergoing retinopathy screening. These outcomes
were relevant to only some of the investments. For
example, commissioners expected some investments in
diabetes to reduce emergency admissions and some to
improve health. When survey respondents described the
expected outcome for their diabetes investment as
‘improved disease-speciﬁc health outcome’, we assigned
this initiative to a speciﬁc QOF indicator. We assigned
any diabetes initiative designed to help patients manage
their condition better to an expected outcome of an
improvement in HbA1c. We assigned any initiative about
retinopathy to the expected outcome of an increase in
patients with diabetes undergoing retinal screening.
HES and QOF data were obtained for all years
between 2007/2008 and 2010/2011, that is, 1 year prior
to the marginal investments and at least 1 year after the
marginal investments. From the HES data we calculated
the annual directly age and sex standardised emergency
admission rates per 100 000 population for each of our
three conditions and for all emergency admissions using
documented standardisation methods.11 We used the
International Classiﬁcation of Diseases 10th Edition
(ICD 10) primary diagnosis codes E10-E14 for diabetes,
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J40-J44 for COPD and I2-I25 and I50 for CHD.
We obtained QOF data from the NHS Information
website for the period 2007/2008 to 2010/2011 (http://
www.ic.nhs.uk/statistics-and-data-collections/audits-and-
performance/the-quality-and-outcomes-framework)
Analysis
We anticipated that, where a local commissioner had
started a new initiative in 2008/2009 with speciﬁed
primary outcomes expected within 2 years, we would be
able to see a change in those expected outcomes com-
pared with local commissioners reporting no invest-
ments in that year. We expected the size of change in
outcome to be related to the size of marginal investment
made per year per patient with the condition.
Separate analyses were undertaken for individual out-
comes for individual conditions. We excluded the PCTs
making reconﬁgurations and disinvestments (2 PCTs in
2008/2009 and 14 in 2009/2010) so that the analysis
focused on investments only. We excluded PCTs which
had their largest initiative in the previous 2 years to
ensure that outcomes from initiatives in previous years
did not contaminate the analysis. We compared out-
comes in 2010/2011 (after investment) with outcomes
in 2007/2008 (before investment) for any initiatives with
outcomes expected within 2 years for 2008/2009 initia-
tives and within 1 year for 2009/2010 initiatives. Where a
PCT had invested in 2008/2009 and 2009/2010, both
investments were included.
We undertook a linear regression with the outcome in
2010/2011 as the dependent variable, adjusting for the
outcome in 2007/2008. We then tested the size of invest-
ment per patient with the condition as a continuous
variable, with PCTs that had made no investment
included as zero. We adjusted for the potential con-
founding variables of deprivation, age structure of popu-
lation (% PCT population aged over 75) and the
proportion of single-handed practices within a PCT
because these have been found to be associated with our
selected outcomes.12 13 We undertook weighted least
squares regression weighted by the denominator of rates
used in the dependent variable to account for PCT
population size.
Cost-effectiveness modelling
We considered the cost-effectiveness of effective invest-
ments only—HbA1c for patients with diabetes. We used
an existing model to estimate the cost per QALY of
investments aimed at reducing HbA1c.14 The health
beneﬁt—the incremental quality adjusted life years—was
estimated by using risk equations to determine health
outcomes based on changes in HbA1c. Cost-effectiveness
estimates for investments were then obtained by dividing
the incremental costs of PCT investments (net of any
savings associated with better health outcomes) by the
incremental quality adjusted life years. The model used
addresses type 2 diabetes, although our initiatives
encompassed type 1 as well as type 2 diabetes. However,
type 2 diabetes accounts for 90% of patients with dia-
betes in the UK.15
RESULTS
Response rates to surveys
Fifty-one per cent (77/152) of PCTs agreed to partici-
pate in the survey in 2009 and a further 14 PCTs agreed
to participate in 2010 (60%, 91/152).
Marginal investments
Most of the largest commissioning initiatives started in
2008/2009 and 2009/2010 rather than in earlier years
(table 1). Commissioners described a wide range of size
of investments (mean investment of £391k in 2008/2009
and mean investment of £362k in 2009/2010). The size
and source of investments are reported in table 2 for
each condition/service. In 2008/2009 two PCTs
reported cost-neutral service reconﬁgurations and no
PCTs reported disinvestments. In 2009/2010 there were
12 cost-neutral reconﬁgurations and two disinvestments
reported.
Outcomes expected
We asked respondents for one or two main or primary
outcomes they expected to achieve for their largest mar-
ginal investment. We also asked for secondary outcomes
and when they would be likely to see any change in out-
comes (immediately, within 1 year, within 2 years, longer
than 2 years). The outcomes which commissioners
expected to achieve were very similar for investments
starting in 2008/2009 and 2009/2010. The most
common primary outcomes expected were a reduction
in emergency admissions (48% of initiatives) and
improved disease-speciﬁc health outcomes (40% of
initiatives). The most common main outcomes which
commissioners expected to occur immediately or within
1 year were a reduction in emergency admissions (36%),
improved disease-speciﬁc outcomes (23%), increase in
access to care (20%), movement of care into the com-
munity (20%) and ‘other’ (18%). As stated in the
methods, we were able to ﬁnd routine data for emer-
gency admissions and diabetes-speciﬁc health outcomes
only. For diabetes, nine PCTs invested in initiatives
which they expected to reduce emergency admissions,
23 invested in initiatives which they expected to improve
Table 1 Numbers of largest initiatives starting each year
Year
started Diabetes COPD CHD
Emergency and
urgent care
2006/2007 9 12 8 7
2007/2008 13 12 12 12
2008/2009 39 39 37 42
2009/2010 28 31 35 39
CHD, coronary heart disease; COPD, chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease.
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disease-speciﬁc outcomes and 6 invested in initiatives
which they expected to increase retinal screening.
Outcomes achieved
Changes in outcome measures over time are displayed
in table 3. The size of marginal investment did not
predict the outcome for six of the seven outcomes mea-
sured (table 4). The percentage of patients with diabetes
in a PCT with good blood glucose control was higher in
PCTs which invested more to achieve this outcome,
adjusting for baseline. There was a half percent increase
in the % PCT patients with diabetes with HbA1c<7 for
every extra £10 invested per year per diabetes patient
(p=0.023). However, this ﬁnding was compromised by a
change in the way the indicator was measured in QOF
in different years. A threshold of HbA1c<7.5 was applied
in QOF in 2007/2008 and 2008/2009; this was changed
to HbA1c<7 in 2009/2010 and 2010/2011.
Effect of commissioning processes on outcomes
We tested process variables to see if the blood glucose
outcome achieved was dependent on how an investment
Table 2 Size of investment in largest initiatives in 2008/2009
Diabetes
N=39
COPD
N=39
CHD
N=37
Emergency and
urgent care N=42
Investment (£)
Mean 276 597 179 901 455 642 642 550
Median 200 000 100 000 255 000 440 000
Range 10–1500 k 6.5–800 k 0–7198k 0–4000k
Mean investment per patient with condition (£) 17.88 16.61 27.63 2.15
Type of investment %recurrent 85% (33/39) 76% (28/37) 86% (31/36) 68% (27/40)
Source of budget standard PCT 92% (36/39) 84% (32/38) 83% (30/36) 95% (39/41)
CHD, coronary heart disease; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.
Table 3 Change in outcomes for PCTs with large, small and no investments
Size of investment
Number of PCTs
with investment
Outcome in
2007/2008
Outcome in
2010/2011
Change in
outcome
Diabetes emergency admissions per 100 000
Large 9 94 103 +9
Small – – – –
None 12 82 89 +7
COPD emergency admissions per 100 000
Large 25 175 186 +11
Small 18 169 184 +15
None 10 167 198 +31
CHD emergency admissions per 100 000
Large 12 343 291 −52
Small 5 272 238 −34
None 10 291 256 −35
All emergency admissions per 100 000
Large 17 9027 9653 +626
Small 12 8764 9199 +435
None 7 9109 9718 +609
Percentage of diabetes HbA1c<7
Large 14 61 49 −12
Small 9 60 47 −13
None 12 60 46 −14
Percentage of diabetes HbA1c<9
Large 14 87 82 −5
Small 9 88 82 −6
None 12 88 82 −6
Per cent undergoing retinopathy screening
Large 4 80 83 +3
Small 2 82 86 +4
None 12 85 86 +1
CHD, coronary heart disease; COPD, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; HbA1c, glycated haemoglobin; PCT, primary care trust.
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was developed and managed. There was no evidence that
the outcome was dependent on whether the initiative
was reported to have been instigated by the PCT,
practice-based commissioners or a group of commis-
sioners (p=0.659); whether specialist clinicians were
involved in developing and shaping the initiative
(p=0.834); whether any general practitioner was involved
in developing and shaping the initiative (p=0.263);
whether public health specialists were involved in devel-
oping and shaping the initiative (p=0.176); whether
patients or the public developed and shaped the
initiative (p=0.884); the extent to which there had been
assessment of need, cost and evidence (p=0.792); the
level of leadership and management (p=0.804); or
the extent of lack of barriers to the initiatives relating to
disinvestment and competing priorities (p=0.813).
Cost-effectiveness
In order to evaluate the cost-effectiveness of any invest-
ments expected to improve blood glucose control, it was
necessary to estimate the difference in the change in
HbA1c between the investing and non-investing PCTs.
We did not know the nature of the change in distribu-
tion of HbA1c, that is, whether the change in propor-
tions was due to a small number of individuals crossing
the lower threshold, or a more overall shift in the distri-
bution. We assumed a lognormal distribution for HbA1c
in the population of people with diabetes, and ﬁtted the
distribution to the data in table 5, to obtain summary
statistics for use in our model. The investing and
non-investing PCTs had a slightly different baseline
distribution of HbA1c scores: 61% versus 60%. We took
measures to adjust the estimates for the differences at
baseline. We sampled values for the change in the non-
investing group from the log-normal distribution, and
applied the change to sampled values from the baseline
investing group. This provided an estimate of what the
2009/2010 HbA1c scores would be for the investing
group if they had not invested. The absolute difference
in the mean HbA1c for the investing versus non-
investing PCTs was small: 0.0065% lower for the invest-
ing PCTs. The aggregate discounted cost of the invest-
ment was £124 per patient. The lifetime net costs from
the impact of investment on medication use and treating
diabetes-related complications was a saving of £3. The
lifetime gain in Quality-Adjusted life Years (QALYs) was
0.00 038, giving a cost-effectiveness ratio of £321 000
which is highly unfavourable against the conventional
willingness-to-pay threshold of £20 000 per QALY. There
was uncertainty around parameters in the economic
model and probabilistic sensitivity analysis indicated a
15% chance that the investment was cost-effective.
DISCUSSION
Summary of findings
Each year healthcare commissioners make targeted mar-
ginal investments, expecting to achieve a variety of
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outcomes in the short and longer term. We found little
data available nationally that allowed us to measure the
outcomes which commissioners hoped to achieve with
their marginal investments. The most robust outcome
measure we found was emergency admissions for differ-
ent conditions calculated using Hospital Episode
Statistics data. We found no evidence of a reduction in
emergency admissions associated with investments in
our study. Some sources of routine data such as the
Quality Outcomes Framework were not as useful as
Hospital Episode Statistics because changes made to the
indicators in different years made comparisons over
time difﬁcult. We found evidence of an improvement in
good HbA1c control for diabetes related to the size of
marginal investment, although this ﬁnding was compro-
mised by a change in how the outcome was measured
over time. In a cost-effectiveness model this impact was
unlikely to be cost-effective.
Putting findings in the context of other research
As described earlier in the paper, there is limited evi-
dence about the effect of local commissioning on out-
comes, particularly health outcomes.3 6 A review of
clinical commissioning found no studies which
attempted to measure the effect of commissioning on
clinical outcomes such as blood glucose levels in dia-
betes. Therefore, our study is unique in that aspect.
There is evidence that one model of local commission-
ing—Total Purchasing Pilots in 1996/1997—reduced
emergency admission bed days 16 which appears to con-
ﬂict with our ﬁnding that there was no effect of local
commissioning investments made by PCTs on emer-
gency admission rates. The different results might be
explained by the focus on admission rates in our study
rather than bed days (which also includes length of
stay), although it is interesting to note that a minority of
total purchasing pilots had a sustained priority of
impacting on emergency admissions, with some aban-
doning it as a priority possibly due to it being difﬁcult to
achieve.16 A systematic review showed that a large
number of initiatives aimed at reducing emergency
admissions have a limited research evidence base or
have been shown not to work.17 That is, PCT commis-
sioners in our study were trying to address a problem
where little has been shown to be effective even under
research conditions.
There is evidence that commissioning models have
impacted on outcomes which we did not measure in our
study. These include referrals to secondary care, pre-
scribing costs, waiting times for elective treatment and
outpatients,16 smoking cessation and breast screening
coverage.7 There is also evidence that commissioning
did not affect outcomes which we did not measure in
our study.16 For example, PCTs with referral manage-
ment schemes did not impact on outpatient attendance
rates compared with PCTs without them.18 An additional
complexity faced by local commissioners is that the types
of outcomes expected of commissioning include poten-
tially conﬂicting priorities. For example, local commis-
sioners may need to trade off improved efﬁciency for
improved access or equity.19
Strengths and limitations
The main strengths of the study were that we attempted
to measure the outcomes of local commissioning to
address an evidence gap, that we focused on outcomes
which commissioners themselves hoped to achieve in a
large number of commissioning organisations, and that
we used a controlled before and after design to measure
change over time compared with PCTs making no
investment. A related design has been used successfully
in other studies to identify the effect of PCT initiatives
on outpatient attendance rates.18 There were seven lim-
itations. First, the data we collected on the investments
may not have fully reﬂected reality because the initia-
tives invested in were often multicomponent, the level
of detail we required was sometimes not known, or the
detail was not known by the individual commissioners
because they had not been in post for long. Second, we
found very little routine data of good quality, which was
measured consistently over the time period required, to
allow us to measure the many outcomes expected by
commissioners. For example, some of our commis-
sioners invested in education and self-management
training for type 2 diabetes because it can affect weight
loss and smoking cessation20 but there was no national
data at PCT level for these outcomes. Therefore, our
study could underestimate the impact of commissioning
on expected outcomes because it did not include meas-
urement of some important outcomes. Third, changes
in how the QOF indicators were measured over time
limited their value to our study. Fourth, the analysis was
Table 5 Change in distribution of HbA1c in PCTs making marginal investments versus those not
Good control, n (%) Moderate control, n (%) Poor control, n (%)
PCTs that invested N=23
2007/2008 (before) ≤7.5 (61%) 7.6–10 (27%) >10 (12%)
2010/2011 (after) ≤7 (48%) 7.1–9 (34%) >9 (18%)
PCTs that did not invest N=12
2007/2008 (before) ≤7.5 (60%) 7.6–10 (28%) >10 (12%)
2010/2011 (after) ≤7 (46%) 7.1–9 (36%) >9 (18%)
HbA1c, glycated haemoglobin; PCT, primary care trust.
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undertaken at the PCT level with a small number of
PCTs within each analysis resulting in low statistical
power to detect differences, particularly if differences
were small. Fifth, our analysis focused on single out-
comes, requiring a large effect on a single outcome.
Some effects may be small but still of signiﬁcance. Also,
rather than having a large effect on a single outcome,
the initiatives PCTs invested in may have had a small
effect on multiple outcomes.14 Indeed some outcomes
further down the pathway of outcomes may be the most
economically beneﬁcial, for example, diabetes educa-
tion programmes reduce smoking rates which cause
longer term reductions in cardiovascular risk.14 Sixth,
selection bias was likely to be present in our study. Only
60% of PCTs took part in the survey. These PCTs were
not representative of all PCTs. They were less likely to
be in ﬁnancial deﬁcit and more likely to have a good
assessment during national reviews of the quality of
commissioning.10 They also had higher emergency
admission rates than non-responding PCTs although
their disease-speciﬁc outcomes were identical. That is,
they were PCTs in a position to invest, and wanting to
invest to impact on a speciﬁc outcome because their
commissioners perceived they had a problem relative to
other PCTs. Finally, there is the limitation of attributing
changes found to the investments made. Although we
measured whether commissioners obtained the out-
comes they expected, regardless of whether the inter-
vention they invested in could deliver such an outcome,
we did not consider the plausibility of these interven-
tions impacting on the expected outcomes. This
concern about attribution particularly applies to the out-
comes measured using QOF because QOF is an incen-
tive for general practices to improve health and
healthcare and we did not control for any actions taken
by general practices. Researchers undertaking similar
types of studies have faced this challenge of attribution
when using QOF.21
Implications
We detected little or no change in outcomes associated
with marginal investments made by local commissioners.
There are three possible explanations for this ﬁnding.
First, that the investments did not produce improved
outcomes. It may be unfair to draw this conclusion
because of some of the limitations of our study.
However, it is worth noting that we could ﬁnd relatively
few studies which did identify commissioning affecting
the outcomes we measured. It is also the case that local
commissioners may be trying to affect some outcomes
that are very important but which are difﬁcult to
improve. In particular, a review of 1530 controlled
studies evaluating interventions to reduce emergency
admissions concluded there was insufﬁcient or no con-
vincing evidence to support most of them.17 A second
possible explanation is that outcomes were produced
and were potentially detectable but were not detected
due to limitations in the available data. This is a likely
conclusion to draw from our study because we only mea-
sured a limited number of outcomes due to the lack of
availability of good quality routine data. A third possible
explanation is that outcomes were produced but were
not detectable due to the changes being small in mul-
tiple conﬂicting outcomes occurring in a constantly
changing complex environment. The complexity of the
pathways by which any investments are expected to have
an impact on patient outcomes or service activity levels,
and the likely interaction with many confounding
factors which also inﬂuence these outcomes, means that
even if an investment has a relatively clear evidence base
it is not possible to assume that the impact will be
similar when replicated in a different setting or different
population. Additionally, some outcomes may be in con-
ﬂict as commissioners may need to trade off improved
efﬁciency for improved access or equity.19
In terms of transferability of these ﬁndings, we under-
took our study at a time when many local commissioners
were receiving increasing resources and were able to
invest in new initiatives. Our commissioners described
few examples of disinvestments. Local commissioners
may be more focused on disinvestment in times of eco-
nomic downturn. Additionally, local commissioning
models are different in other countries and have
already changed in England since we completed this
study. Even so, measuring the effect of local commis-
sioning on outcomes is an important issue and measur-
ing the effect of marginal investments remains relevant
given the continuing focus of new commissioning
models in England on marginal changes.22 Data avail-
ability, and attribution of effect, are likely to be the
largest challenges facing those wishing to measure the
effect of local commissioning. Regardless of these chal-
lenges, it remains important to understand the impact
of local commissioning. We would recommend that,
rather than take the approach we took here, future eva-
luations are built into the commissioning process so
that there is a clear speciﬁcation of anticipated out-
comes that will allow appropriate outcome data in the
target areas (and appropriate control groups) to be
gathered. Data availability for some key outcomes was
poor for our national study but more data are available
locally than nationally, and available at general practice
level, that are helpful for modelling the effect of local
commissioning decisions.23 The challenge of attribution
can be addressed by gathering detailed information
about the range of new initiatives occurring in each
local commissioning area in addition to those funded
by the local commissioners.
CONCLUSIONS
Local commissioners made investments with the aim of
improving a wide range of outcomes. There is limited
consistently measured routine data relevant to these out-
comes, which is available at a national level. We found
little or no impact on the limited number of outcomes
8 O’Cathain A, et al. BMJ Open 2015;5:e009336. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2015-009336
Open Access
group.bmj.com on November 10, 2015 - Published by http://bmjopen.bmj.com/Downloaded from 
we could measure—reduction in emergency admissions
for diabetes, CHD, COPD and all conditions; and blood
glucose management for diabetes.
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